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1 Introduction
Strong evidence supports the existence of peer effects in intervention programs aiming at
increasing the adoption of new agricultural1 or health technologies2 in developing countries among
neighbors, family members or friends.3 While the body of evidence on these programs is growing,
how they should be optimally designed is not theoretically well understood. How is it possible
to induce individuals who care about each other to adopt a new technology? Is it less costly
than for individuals who don’t? Should intervention programs treat individuals equally? Should
pro-social motivation lead to less or more inequality? These questions arise when designing an
intervention program that aims to support the adoption of new technologies or more generally
when a principal wants to induce successful coordination among individuals who care about each
other.
In this paper, I study a situation in which a principal offers subsidies to the members of a
group of agents who have pro-social preferences to induce them to adopt a technology. Each
agent’s decision to adopt the technology generates externalities for the other agents and the level
of externality enjoyed by these agents depends on whether they also adopt the technology or
not, which is the reason why there are peer effects in this setting. I assume that the individuals
have quasi-maximin pro-social preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), that is they give weight
to their own payoff (as selfish motivation), to the sum of the payoffs (a collective motivation)
and to the minimum payoff (a Rawlsian motivation). The principal designs the least-cost subsidy
scheme such that the agents adopt the technology. Since intervention programs usually provide
individual subsidies (e.g. individual vouchers, free distribution or price discount), I assume that
the level of subsidy offered to one agent cannot depend on the other agents’ decisions. The aim
of the present paper is to analyze how pro-social preferences affect the optimal subsidy scheme
as well as objective inequality -the difference between individual material payoffs- and subjective
inequality -the difference between individual utility levels.
The most interesting results are derived in the case of positive peer effects. I characterize
the optimal subsidy scheme that implements technology adoption by all the agents as a unique
Nash equilibrium (“unique implementation”). I show that pro-social preferences lead to lower
individual subsidies. Moreover, the existence of pro-social preferences lead to an increase in
objective inequality -the difference between individual material payoffs- while they lead to a
decrease in subjective inequality - the difference between individual utility levels. However, in
the specific case where the agents have a pure Rawlsian motivation, objective inequality is the
same as with purely selfish agents while subjective inequality decreases.
I also analyze the implications of alternative assumptions and I provide several extensions.
While the main results are derived in the case where the principal seeks to induce technology
adoption by all the agents as a unique Nash equilibrium, the literature that deals with the optimal
design of contracts with externalities among the agents has also considered the situation where
1See Foster and Rosenzweig (1995); Munshi (2004); Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Conley and Udry (2010); Carter
et al. (2019)
2See Kremer and Miguel (2007); Oster and Thornton (2012); Dupas (2014); Tarozzi et al. (2014); Adhvaryu
(2014)
3The literature has also studied peer effects in contexts of participation decisions in labor markets (Munshi,
2003), education (Sacerdote, 2001; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Bayer et al., 2008), criminal networks (Glaeser et al.,
1996; Bayer et al., 2009), financial decisions (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2013), peer pressure in firms
(Mas and Moretti, 2009), or fertility decisions (Munshi and Myaux, 2006).
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the principal can coordinate the agents on his preferred equilibrium (as in Segal, 1999). I thus
characterize the optimal contract that implements adoption of the technology by the agents of
the group as one (of possibly many) Nash equilibrium (“partial implementation”). I show that
in this case, homogeneous agents should get the same level of subsidy. I then extend the model
to a situation where the agents are heterogeneous. I consider two types of heterogeneity: the
agents either have heterogeneous costs and benefits (which is important to understand technology
adoption, see Suri, 2011) or they have altruistic preferences (in the spirit of Bourle`s et al., 2017),
that is they may give different weights to the payoff of each other agents. I also extend the
model to the case where non adopters benefit from positive externalities and show that the main
results are not affected. I finally analyze the case where peer effects are negative, that is when
adopters receive lower externalities than non adopters from adopters. I show that in this case,
the (homogenous) agents all receive the same subsidy and then there is no inequality.
In the last part of the paper, I argue that the model can be used as an underlying theory for
the empirical analysis of peer effects in the adoption of new health or agricultural technologies.
Most of existing empirical studies in this literature provide evidence that individuals are more
likely to adopt a new technology when the number of peers that decide to adopt (or benefit from
a subsidized price or free access to) the technology is larger (i.e. positive peer effects). This holds
for a number of health (Hawley et al., 2003; Oster and Thornton, 2012; Dupas, 2014; Adhvaryu,
2014) and agricultural technologies (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Conley and
Udry, 2010; Carter et al., 2019). An exception is Kremer and Miguel (2007) who find negative
peer effects in the case of a deworming program.4 I first argue that the estimates of peer effects
(and technology adoption decisions) are likely to be partly driven by the fact that the individuals
in the samples are from the same family, network of friends or are neighbors, and that they care
about each other. My theoretical results suggest that pro-social preferences increase the estimates
of peer effects and the likelihood of adoption. This suggests that empirical studies (that do not
take this dimension into account) tend to overestimate positive peer effects and underestimate
negative peer effects. More importantly, this may also explain why the literature finds more
often positive peer effects than negative peer effects. The model has also implications for the
design of optimal subsidy (or free delivery) interventions. In particular, my results combined
with the results from the empirical literature suggest that subsidies should be uniform in the
case of deworming programs, while anti-malaria prevention technologies and agricultural inputs
adoption should be encouraged using differentiated subsidies (or free delivery to a subset of the
population), and this is especially true when the individuals are friends or members of the same
family. I also discuss the acceptability of differentiated subsidies. I argue that acceptability is
not necessarily an issue since pro-social preferences lead to lower subjective inequality.
This paper contributes to the literature on discriminatory incentives. Incentives are said to
be (endogenously) discriminatory when they involve non symmetric rewards even when all the
agents are identical, and the objective of the principal is to induce participation of all the agents.
Optimal incentives can be discriminatory in various contexts, such as exclusionary contracts
(Rasmusen et al., 1991, Innes and Sexton, 1994), introductory prices by a monopolist in the
presence of consumption externalities (Farrell and Saloner, 1985, Katz and Shapiro, 1986),5 in
4Another exception is Bandiera and Rasul (2006) who find evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between
farmers’ adoption of a new crop and the number of adopters.
5See also Bensaid and Lesne (1996) and Cabral et al. (1999).
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general trade contracts (Segal, 2003), and in organizations (Winter, 2004). As in several papers
in this literature, the optimal subsidy scheme derived in the present paper (when peer effects
are positive) is characterized by a divide and conquer property : each agent gets a subsidy that
would convince him to adopt the technology when all the agents who precede him in an arbitrary
ranking also adopt the technology.6 However, this literature has exclusively focused on agents
with standard preferences. In many contexts, such as when designing an optimal intervention
program supporting the adoption of new technology in developing countries, the principal has to
consider the fact that the agents care about each other. This is the main purpose of the present
paper.
This paper contributes to the literature on contracts with externalities. The seminal con-
tribution by Segal (1999) shows, in a general setting, that partial implementation contracts are
inefficient in the presence of multilateral externalities (assuming standard, selfish preferences). In
a setting where the agents make technology adoption decisions, I show that pro-social preferences
affect the optimal partial implementation contract and that they decrease the implementation
cost for the principal. Segal (2003) studies, in a general setting, the property of the optimal
unique implementation contract and shows that forbidding the principal to propose discrimina-
tory contracts aggravates inefficiencies when the agent’s actions are strategic complements.7 In
the present paper, I extend this literature and study both the partial and the unique imple-
mentation contract when the agents have pro-social preferences in a situation where the agents
make binary decisions (as in Winter, 2004) and their actions are either strategic complements
(i.e. positive peer effects) or strategic substitutes (i.e. negative peer effects). This literature
has not yet considered how pro-social preferences shape the relationship between incentives and
discrimination and inequality, a consideration which is the purpose of the present paper.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on behavioral contract theory (see
Koszegi, 2014 for a review). Indeed, the present paper consider a principal who contracts with
multiple agents who have pro-social preferences, it is thus related to the contributions that have
considered contracting with multiple agents. This literature has focused on the case of inequity-
averse and/or status-seeking agents.8 An exception is Dur and Sol (2010), who focus on (en-
dogenous) altruism. My main focus is on the coordination problem and inequality, while the
aforementioned contribution asks whether incentives can help to generate altruism. Another
exception is Sarkisian (2017), who study the role of altruism and Kantian morality when a prin-
cipal seeks to motivate a team of two agents. The present paper differs from this contribution
because I focus on bilateral contracting (and not on team incentives) and also tackle the issues
of coordination and inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2.
Section 3 delivers the main results. In Section 4 I analyze alternative assumptions and I provide
several extensions. Section 5 discusses policy implications. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All
6Segal (2003) and Bernstein and Winter (2012) find that the optimal contract has a similar structure in settings
with standard preferences. Che and Yoo (2001) find that the optimal mechanism in a moral hazard in a team
problem has also a similar structure.
7This model has been extended in several directions. See Bernstein and Winter (2012) and Sakovics and Steiner
(2012) for contracting problems with heterogeneous externalities. See Bloch and Gomes (2006), Genicot and Ray
(2006) and Galasso (2008) for dynamic models.
8See Itoh (2004), Demougin et al. (2006), Neilson and Stowe (2008), Bartling and von Siemens (2010), and
Bartling (2011) for models with two inequity-averse or status-seeking agents. See Cabrales et al. (2008) for a
dynamic model of the labor market.
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proofs are provided in an appendix.
2 The model
A principal offers individual subsidies (bilateral contracts) to several agents in an environment
characterized by externalities between the agents. The timing is as follows: first, the principal
proposes a publicly observable subsidy scheme to a set of agents; second, the agents observe the
principal’s proposition and simultaneously decide whether to adopt or not the technology at their
individual subsidized price.
For the ease of presentation, I focus on positive peer effects in the main part of the paper,
and I show how the results differ when considering negative peer effects in Section 4.4.
An agent who decides to adopt the new technology obtains a private benefit b̂ and generates
a positive externality w ≥ 0 for the other agents who also adopt the technology and no exter-
nality for the agents who do not adopt the technology.9 An agent who decides not to adopt the
technology receives an outside option ĉ (e.g. the profit of a farmer who does not use fertilizers).
The principal aims to induce full technology adoption at the lowest possible cost. In order to
reach this goal, she proposes a subsidy scheme v = (v1, v2, ..., vn) to the agents in the set of agents
N , with i = 1, 2, ..., n, in order to provide them with incentives to adopt the technology. The
subsidy is conditioned on the agent adopting the technology (i.e. agent i receives vi from the
principal if he adopts the technology and 0 otherwise). The subsidy scheme v is designed such
that each agent receives a unique offer υi, i ∈ N , that is to say that the principal is able to use
individualized subsidies. The vector of agents’ decisions is x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, where xi = 1
means that agent i chooses to adopt the technology while xi = 0 means that that agent decides
not to adopt the technology.
When agent i adopts the new technology and m other agents also adopt this technology
(m+ 1 = card{j ∈ N : xj = 1}), agent i’s material payoff is:
pii(x) = b̂+ vi +mw, (1)
and,
pii(x) = ĉ, (2)
if agent i does not adopt the technology (xi = 0).
I assume that the agents have social preferences and that they give weight to their own payoff
(a “selfish” motive) and to the payoffs of all the agents (a pro-social motive). Formally, the utility
of agent i is:
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θW (pi(x)), (3)
where pi(x) = (pi1(x), ..., pin(x)) is vector of the agents’ payoffs, 1− θ ∈]0, 1] is the weight that the
agents give to their own payoff, and W is their pro-social motivation function. This pro-social
motivation is a function of the vector of payoffs.
In the rest of the paper, I denote the (net) opportunity cost as:
c = ĉ− b̂ (4)
9See Section 4.3 for an extension to the case where the non adopters benefit from a positive externality from
adopters.
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In most of the paper,10 I will assume that the agents have quasi-maximin preferences (Char-
ness and Rabin, 2002), which is a commonly used functional form in the literature.
Assumption QM (Quasi-maximin): The pro-social motivation function is a weighted sum of
the minimum payoff and of the sum of the payoffs, W (pi(x)) = ηmin{pi1(x), ..., pin(x)} + (1 −
η)
∑
j∈N pij(x) where η ∈ [0, 1].
This pro-social motivation function gives weight η to the minimum payoff (a Rawlsian moti-
vation) and 1− η to the sum of the payoffs (a collective motivation).
Using this specification, the utility of agent i can be rewritten as follows:
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θη min{pi1(x), ..., pin(x)}+ θ(1− η)
∑
j∈N
pij(x), (5)
where 1 − θ is the weight of the selfish motivation, θη is the weight of the Rawlsian motivation
and θ(1− η) is the weight of the collective motivation.
In the following, I characterize the optimal contract that implements the adoption of the
technology by all the agents as a unique Nash equilibrium of the adoption game (i.e. the optimal
unique implementation contract).11
As I will show in the next section, the optimal unique implementation contract belongs to a
set of contracts characterized by the divide and conquer property (DAC).12 This set of contracts
is such that the agents are ordered according to an arbitrary ranking and each agent prefers to
adopt the technology when all the agents that precede him in the ranking adopt the technology
and all the agents that follow him in the ranking do not. The optimal contract also belongs to
a smaller set of contracts characterized by the decreasing divide and conquer property (DDAC).
This set of contracts is characterized by the DAC property and by the fact that the subsidies
are decreasing according to the ranking of the agents: each agent receives a smaller subsidy than
the agents that precede him and a larger subsidy than the agents that follow him in the ranking.
As will be clear in the results, the DAC property is useful to characterize the optimal contract
when the agents have collective motivations and the DDAC property is useful to characterize the
optimal contract when the agents have a Rawlsian motivation.
I will also provide comparative statics results on the effect of a change in pro-social preferences
(θ) on the differences between the agents’ material payoffs (i.e. objective inequality) and on the
differences between the agents’ utility levels (i.e. subjective inequality). Notice that, because
the agents are symmetric,13 the difference in the material payoffs of two agents is equal to the
difference in their subsidy levels when the optimal unique implementation contract is set in place:
pi∗i − pi∗j = v∗i − v∗j .
10See Section 4 for extensions to situations where the agents give heterogeneous weights to the payoffs of the
other agents.
11In Section 4.1 I investigate the case in which the principal is able to coordinate the agents on her preferred
equilibrium (partial implementation) as in Segal (1999) for instance. More precisely, I characterize the optimal
contract that implements full technology adoption as a Nash equilibrium (among possibly many).
12Segal (2003), Winter (2004) and Bernstein and Winter (2012) also find optimal contracts that belong to this
set in settings with standard (selfish) preferences.
13See Section 4 for extensions to the case of heterogeneous agents.
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3 Main Results
In order to disentangle the role of each component of the quasi-maximin preferences, I will
first consider the case in which the agents’ pro-social motivation is a pure collective motivation
(η = 0), then I will focus on the case where their pro-social motivation is purely Rawlsian (η = 1)
and finally I will consider the more general case in which they give weight to both (0 ≤ η ≤ 1).
3.1 Collective motivation (η = 0)
I assume here that the agents give no weight to the minimum payoff (i.e. η = 0). The utility
of agent i is:
Ui(x) = θpii(x) + (1− θ)
∑
j∈N
pij(x). (6)
In this case, I show the following result:
Proposition 1: If the agents’ pro social motivation is purely a collective motivation (η = 0), the
optimal subsidy scheme that implements full technology adoption as a unique Nash equilibrium of
the adoption game is:
v∗i = c− (i− 1)w − θ(i− 1)w,
for i = 1, ..., n.
This result states that collective motivation affects the optimal subsidy scheme. The logic
behind the result can be illustrated using a two agent example:
Example [two agents with collective motivations]: Consider the case of two agents i = 1, 2
with collective motivations. The payoff of agent i is pii(x) = b̂+w+ vi if the two agents adopt the
technology and pii(x) = ĉ if agent i does not adopt the technology (whenever agent j 6= i adopts
the technology or not). The utility of agent i = 1, 2 is Ui(x) = (1 − θ)pii(x) + θ (pi1(x) + pi2(x)).
In this example, the divide and conquer property (DAC) holds when agent 1 prefers to adopt the
technology than not when agent 2 does not adopt the technology,
(1− θ)v1 + θ (v1 + c) ≥ (1− θ)c+ θ(2c); (7)
and agent 2 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agent 1 adopts the technology,
(1− θ) (v2 + w) + θ (v1 + v2 + 2w) ≥ (1− θ)c+ θ (v1 + c) . (8)
Assume that the DAC property holds. Condition (7) is equivalent to v1 ≥ c, in other words the
first agent cannot get a subsidy that is smaller than his outside option. Condition (8) is equiva-
lent to v2 + w − c + θw ≥ 0. The least cost subsidy scheme such that the decreasing divide and
conquer property holds is thus such that v1 = c and v2 = c− (1+θ)w. In other words, agent 2 has
to receive a subsidy that equals his net outside option minus the externality generated by agent 1
and the externality he generates for agent 1 weighted by agent 2’s pro-social preference parameter.
The effect of collective motivation on the optimal contract is quite intuitive. As in the case
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with standard preferences (see Bernstein and Winter, 2012), the optimal contract is characterized
by the divide-and-conquer property. An agent is indifferent between not adopting and adopting
the technology when all the preceding agents in the arbitrary ranking adopt the technology and
all the subsequent agents do not. Compared to the situation with standard preferences, the prin-
cipal can decrease the transfer made to the agent by the agent’s valuation of the externalities
that agent generates for the preceding agents, in other words by θ(i − 1)w for the agent ranked
i+ 1 in the ranking.
Let us now focus on the implications in terms of objective and subjective inequality. The
difference in the material payoffs of two subsequent agents is pi∗i −pi∗i+1 = v∗i −v∗i+1 = (1+θ)w and
the corresponding difference in their utility levels is U∗i −U∗i+1 = (1− θ)(pi∗i − pi∗i+1) = (1− θ2)w.
I can thus provide the following comparative static results:
Corollary 1: If the agents’ pro social motivation is purely collective (η = 0), then pro-social
preferences increase objective inequality while they decrease subjective inequality. Formally,
∂(pi∗i − pi∗i+1)
∂θ
> 0 and
∂(U∗i − U∗i+1)
∂θ
< 0
Hence, when the agents have a collective motivation, the difference in the agents’ material
payoffs is larger. The intuition is that an agent’s subsidy decreases when the weighted sum of
externalities he generates for the preceding agents is larger. Hence, pro-social preferences lead to
a larger decrease in the subsidy received by agent i+ 1 than in the subsidy received by agent i.
However, when the agents have a collective motivation, the difference in the agents’ utility
levels is smaller. The effect of the collective motivation on the utility levels differential is twofold.
There is a direct effect that makes the utility levels less unequal (−(pi∗i − pi∗i+1) = −(1 + θ)w < 0)
because the agents give less weight to their own payoff. There is also an indirect effect that goes
through the effect on the difference in the agents’ material payoffs and that makes the utility
levels more unequal, (1− θ)∂(pi
∗
i−pi∗i+1)
∂θ = (1− θ)w. The direct effect is stronger than the indirect
effect because when the agents have pro-social preferences, they give less weight to their own
payoff and they give a positive weight to the payoffs of the other agents. As a result, pro social
motivations lead to lower subjective inequality.
3.2 Rawlsian motivation (η = 1)
I assume here that the agents give no weight to the sum of the payoffs (η = 1). The utility of
agent i is then:
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θmin{pi1(x), ..., pin(x)}. (9)
In this case, I can show the following result:
Proposition 2: If the agents’ pro social motivation is purely Rawlsian (η = 1), then the optimal
subsidy scheme that implements full technology adoption as a unique Nash equilibrium of the
adoption game is the same as if the agents were purely selfish:
v∗i = c− (i− 1)w,
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for i = 1, ..., n.
This neutrality result is quite surprising. When the agents give weight to the minimum payoff,
the optimal subsidy scheme is not affected compared to the case in which they have standard
preferences.14 The logic behind this result can be illustrated by the following two agents example:
Example [two agents with Rawlsian motivations]: Consider the case of two agents i = 1, 2
with pure Rawlsian motivations. The payoff of agent i is pii(x) = b̂ + w + vi if he adopts the
technology and agent j 6= i also adopts the technology. His payoff is pii(x) = ĉ if he does not
adopt the technology (whenever agent j 6= i adopts it or not). The utility of agent i = 1, 2 is
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θmin{pi1(x), pi2(x)}.
In this example, the decreasing divide and conquer property (DDAC) holds when v1 ≥ v2, and
agent 1 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agent 2 does not adopt the technology,
(1− θ)v1 + θmin{v1, c} ≥ (1− θ)c+ θc; (10)
and agent 2 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agent 1 adopts the technology,
(1− θ) (v2 + w) + θmin{v1 + w, v2 + w} ≥ (1− θ)c+ θmin{v1 + w, c}. (11)
Assume that the DDAC property holds. Since condition (10) is equivalent to v1 ≥ c, in other
words the first agent cannot get a subsidy that is smaller than his net outside option. Using
v1 ≥ v2 and v1 ≥ c, we have that agent 2 obtains a payoff smaller than agent 1 whenever the
former adopts the technology or not. Then condition (11) is equivalent to v2 +w− c ≥ 0. Hence,
the least cost subsidy scheme which induces full technology adoption when the agents have pure
Rawlsian motivations and such that the DDAC property holds is v1 = c and v2 = c−w. This sub-
sidy scheme is also the least cost scheme which induces full technology adoption when the agents
have standard preferences.
The principal is not able to offer lower subsidies than in the case of standard preferences
because the optimal subsidy scheme is characterized by the DDAC property. The optimal scheme
is such that each agent receives the lowest payoff among the set of adopters when all preceding
agents in the ranking are also adopters while all the subsequent agents are not. The first agent in
the ranking receives a subsidy equal to the net opportunity cost c. Now consider the case of the
agent ranked second in the ranking when the first agent adopts the technology. When the second
agent does not adopt the technology, the two agents get c. When he adopts the technology, if
that agent receives a subsidy that is lower than the subsidy he would get if he had standard
preferences (c − w), that agent’s payoff is the minimum payoff (c < c + w) and then his utility
from adopting the technology is lower than his utility from not adopting the technology. The
same logic applies for all subsequent agents.
The DDAC property implies that when all the previous agents in the ranking adopt the
technology while all the subsequent agents do not, the agent is the one with the smallest payoff
whenever she adopts the technology or not. Thus, the fact that he gives weight to both his own
14This result is also in contrast with partial implementation because in this latter case, the principal is able to
take advantage of Rawlsian motivations, even if the agents have no collective motivation. See Section 4.1.
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payoff and to the minimum payoff does not make a difference compared to the case where he only
cares about his own payoff.
Notice that the subsidy received by an agent (v∗i ) decreases when his rank (i) increases, and
then his material payoff (pi∗i ) and his utility level (U
∗
i ) also decrease when his rank (i) increases.
Thus, the first agent is at the top of the distribution of material payoffs and of utility levels. The
difference in the material payoffs of two subsequent agents is pi∗i − pi∗i+1 = v∗i − v∗i+1 = w and the
corresponding difference in their utility levels is U∗i − U∗i+1 = (1 − θ)(pi∗i − pi∗i+1) = (1 − θ2)w. I
can thus provide the following comparative static results:
Corollary 2: If the agents’ pro social motivation is purely Rawlsian (η = 1), then pro-social
preferences do not affect objective inequality while they decrease subjective inequality:
∂(pi∗i − pi∗i+1)
∂θ
= 0 and
∂(U∗i − U∗i+1)
∂θ
< 0
This result follows from the result of Proposition 2. Indeed, Proposition 2 states that the
subsidies does not depend on pure Rawlsian motivations. As a consequence, the difference between
two agents’ payoffs does not depend either on pure Ralwsian motivations. Another consequence
is that pure Rawlsian motivations have only a direct effect on the difference between two agents’
utility levels and this direct effect is negative (because the agents give less weight to their own
payoff). Hence, pure Rawlsian motivations lead to a decrease in subjective inequality.
3.3 Quasi-maximin preferences (0 ≤ η ≤ 1)
I now consider the more general case where the agents give weight to both the minimum
payoff and to the sum of the payoffs. The utility of agent i is then:
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θ
ηmin{pi1(x), ..., pin(x)}+ (1− η)∑
j∈N
pij(x)
 . (12)
In this case, I provide the following characterization:
Proposition 3: If the agents’ pro social motivation is quasi-maximin (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), the optimal
subsidy scheme that implements full technology adoption as a unique Nash equilibrium of the
adoption game is such that v∗1 = c and:
v∗i = c− (i− 1)w (1 + θ(1− η))− θ(1− η)w
i−1∑
t=1
(i− 1− t)(θη)t, (13)
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
Notice that the payoffs of the two first agents do not depend on the Rawlsian component
(v∗1 = c and v∗2 = c− (1 + θ)w). The reason is that in the case of two agents, when the first agent
adopts the technology, the second agent is the one with the minimum payoff whether he adopts
the technology or not. The result of Proposition 3 can be better illustrated using a three agents
example:
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Example [three agents with a quasi-maximin motivation]: Consider the case of three
agents i = 1, 2, 3. The payoff of agent i is pii(x) = b̂ + 2w + vi if the three agents adopt the
technology, pii(x) = b̂+w+ c if agent i adopts the technology and only one of the two other agents
also adopts the technology and pii(x) = ĉ if agent i does not adopt the technology (whenever
the other two agents adopt the technology or not). The utility of agent i = 1, 2, 3 is Ui(x) =
(1− θ)pii(x) + θηmin{pi1(x), pi2(x), pi3(x)}+ θ(1− η) (pi1(x) + pi2(x) + pi3(x)).
In this example, the decreasing divide and conquer property (DDAC) holds when v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3,
and agent 1 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agent 2 adopts the technology,
(1− θ)v1 + θηmin{v1, c}+ θ(1− η) (v1 + 2c) ≥ (1− θ)c+ θηc+ θ(1− η)(3c); (14)
and agent 2 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agent 1 adopts the technology,
(1− θ) (v2 + w) + θηmin{v1 + w, v2 + w, c}+ θ(1− η) (v1 + v2 + 2w + c)
≥ (1− θ)c+ θηmin{v1 + w, c}+ θ(1− η) (v1 + 2c) , (15)
and agent 3 prefers to adopt the technology than not when agents 1 and 2 adopt the technology,
(1− θ) (v3 + 2w) + θηmin{v1 + 2w, v2 + 2w, v3 + 2w}+ θ(1− η) (v1 + v2 + v3 + 6w)
≥ (1− θ)c+ θηmin{v1 + w, v2 + w, c}+ θ(1− η) (v1 + v2 + 2w + c) ,
(16)
Assume that the DDAC property holds. Condition (14) is equivalent to (1 − θη) (v1 − c) +
θηmin{v1− c, 0} ≥ 0 and then to v1 ≥ c, in other words agent 1 cannot receive a subsidy which is
lower than his net outside option. Thus, using v1 ≥ v2, we have that condition (15) is equivalent
to (1 − θη)(v2 + w − c) + θηmin{v2 + w − c, 0} ≥ −θ(1 − η)w. Using v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3, I find that
condition (16) is equivalent to v3 + 2w− c+ 2wθ(1− η) ≥ θηmin{v2 +w− c, 0}. Thus, as long as
the agents have collective motivations (θ(1−η) > 0), the subsidy that agent 2 receives can be such
that he obtains a lower payoff when he adopts the technology than when he does not (v2 +w < c).
Thus, the least cost subsidy scheme such that the decreasing divide and conquer property holds
is such that agent 1 receives a subsidy that is equal to his net outside option, v∗1 = c. Agent 2
receives the same subsidy as when the agents have a pure collective motivation, v∗2 = c− (1 + θ)w.
Rawlsian motivations do not affect agent 2’s subsidy because he receives the lowest payoff when he
adopts the technology together with agent 1 and the lowest payoff (c) when he deviates. Agent 3
receives v∗3 = c− (1 + θ(1− η))w+ θη (v∗2 + 2w − c), or v∗3 = c− 2(1 + θ(1− η))w− θ2η(1− η)w.
The subsidy received by agent 3 depends on his Rawlsian motivation parameter η because he his
the agent with the lowest payoff when he adopts the technology together with agents 1 and 2 while
agent 2 receives the lowest payoff when agent 3 deviates. These subsidies correspond to the opti-
mal unique implementation subsidy scheme.
This result deserves several comments. First, the subsidy levels differ from the case in which
the agents have a pure collective motivation, meaning that Rawlsian motivations affect the optimal
subsidy scheme only if the agents have also a collective motivation. Second, compared to the case
with a pure collective motivation, the agents obtain smaller subsidies, which means that the
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principal is able to take advantage of the presence of both types of pro-social motivations.
The optimal subsidy scheme is still characterized by the DDAC property. This enables the
principal to decrease the subsidy given to each agent to make them indifferent between adopting
and not adopting the technology when all the preceding agents in the ranking adopt the technology
and all the subsequent agents in the ranking do not. The principal can do so because a decrease in
the subsidy given to an agent (weakly) increases the incentive for the subsequent agents to adopt
the technology. Indeed, a decrease in the subsidy given to an agent does not affect the minimum
payoff when the following agent adopts the technology (because in this case, the following agent
is the one who obtains the minimum payoff) while it weakly decreases the minimum payoff when
the following agent does not adopt the technology.
The case with both collective and Rawlsian pro-social motivations differs from the case with
purely Rawlsian pro-social motivations because collective motivations enable the principal to offer
subsidies such that the agents’ payoffs are lower than their net opportunity cost. As a conse-
quence, when all the previous agents in the ranking adopt the technology while all the subsequent
agents do not, the agent is the one with the smallest payoff when that agent adopts the technology
but not when he does not adopt the technology. Thus, in this case, the fact that the agent gives
weight to the minimum payoff makes a difference compared to the case where that agent only
cares about his own payoff.
Let me now focus on the implications in terms of objective and subjective inequality. The
difference in the material payoffs of two subsequent agents is given by:
pi∗i − pi∗i+1 = v∗i − v∗i+1 = w (1 + θ(1− η)) + θ(1− η)w
i−1∑
t=1
(θη)t, (17)
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n and pi∗1 − pi∗2 = v∗1 − v∗2 = w (1 + θ(1− η)).
I can then prove the following result:
Corollary 3 : If the agents have quasi-maximin pro-social motivations (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), then
pro-social preferences lead to an increase in objective inequality and to a decrease in subjective
inequality:
∂(pi∗i − pi∗i+1)
∂θ
≥ 0 and ∂(U
∗
i − U∗i+1)
∂θ
< 0
This result generalizes the implications I have obtained in the case with pure collective motiva-
tions as it states that they are valid in the case where the agents have quasi-maximin preferences.
The intuition is similar to the intuition of the results obtained when the agents have pure collective
motivations (see the discussion below Corollary 1).
4 Alternative assumptions and extensions
4.1 Partial Implementation
In the main part of the paper, I focus on the optimal full implementation subsidy scheme,
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that is the subsidy scheme that induces the agents to adopt the technology as a unique Nash
equilibrium of the adoption game. In the literature, the case of partial implementation has also
be considered (see Segal, 1999). Partial implementation refers to a situation where coordination
is not an issue and the principal can choose his preferred Nash equilibrium of the technology
adoption game. The optimal partial subsidy scheme is the least-cost subsidy scheme that induces
all the agents to adopt the technology as a Nash equilibrium of the technology adoption game
(among possibly many). It is characterized as follows.
Proposition 4: If the agents’ pro-social motivation is quasi-maximin, then the optimal partial
implementation contract is such that:
v∗i = c− (n− 1)w − SPw,
where SP = θ (n−1)(1−η)+η1−θη .
The agents receive a subsidy that is equal to their net opportunity cost minus the sum of the
externalities they receive from the other agents minus their valuation of the externalities they
generate for the other agents ((1 − η)w for each of the n − 1 other agents and ηw for the agent
with the minimum payoff) normalized by the total weight they give to their own payoff (1− θη).
This result implies that, differently from the case where the principal wishes to induce technology
adoption by all the agents as a unique Nash equilibrium, there is here no difference in the payoffs
of the agents, and then inequality is not an issue.15 Remember that, in order to design the
unique implementation contract, the principal has to build a subsidy scheme such that, for each
situation in which not all the agents adopt the technology, at least one agent has an incentive
to deviate. The principal achieves this goal in choosing the least cost contract characterized by
the DAC property. However, since the externalities are positive and the agents have pro-social
preferences, eliminating all possible Nash equilibria that do not correspond to the outcome where
all the agents adopt the technology is costly for the principal.
The main drawback of the optimal partial implementation contract is that the agents’ tech-
nology adoption decision subgame may have multiple Nash equilibria. Here, there are at least
two equilibria: the situation in which all the agents adopt the technology (by definition of partial
implementation) and the situation in which none of the agents adopt the technology (this can be
easily checked because v∗i ≤ c for all i).
Notice that I make here the assumption that the agents are homogenous for ease of compar-
ison with the main results. In the proof of the Proposition provided in Appendix, I provide a
more general characterization of the optimal partial implementation subsidy scheme and I allow
opportunity costs and preferences to be heterogeneous.
4.2 Heterogeneity
I assume here that the agents may have heterogeneous social preferences and that they may
give heterogeneous weight to their own payoff and to the payoffs of all the agents. Formally, the
15Inequality is not an issue as long as the agents are homogenous. For a characterization of the optimal partial
implementation contract with heterogeneous agents, see the proof of Proposition 5. The proof allows for the
opportunity costs c and the preferences parameters θ and η to be heterogeneous.
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utility of agent i is:
Ui(x) = (1− θi)pii(x) + θiWi(pi(x)), (18)
where 1−θi ∈]0, 1] is the weight that the agent i gives to her own payoff, and Wi is her pro-social
motivation.
I allow the weights the agents give to each other agents to differ. This type of heterogeneity
accounts for the possibility of altruistic agents:
Assumption (Altruism): The agents have altruistic preferences if their pro-social motivation
function is a weighted sum of the payoffs, Wi(pi(x)) =
∑
j∈N γijpij(x) where
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N γij = N
and γij = γji ≥ 0 for all i, j.
Using this assumption, I show the following result:
Proposition 5: If the agents have altruistic preferences, then the optimal unique implementation
subsidy scheme is such that agent i is ranked before agent i + 1 if and only if λi ≤ λi+1 where
λi ≡ θi1−θi+θiγii for all i and the optimal subsidies are:
v∗i = ci − (i− 1)w − λi
∑
j<i
γijw,
for all i.
This result states that when the agents are heterogeneous, the subsidy still has to compensate
for their (heterogeneous) net opportunity costs, for the externalities they receive from the pre-
ceding agents and for the weighted sum of the externalities they generate for these agents. The
weight of the externality generated for an agent is proportional to the weight given to the payoff
of this agent γij in the utility function. The proportional coefficient, λi, is an individual measure
of the relative weight agent i gives to the payoff of the other agents (θi) and to the weight he gives
to his own payoff (1−θi+θiγii). Notice that the symmetric situation corresponds to γii = γij = 1
for all i, j.
The ranking of the agents does not depend on their net opportunity cost because the principal
has to compensate for these costs whatever the ranking. The agents ranked first are those who
have the smallest pro-social preference parameters θi, they are thus advantaged compared to the
other agents.
4.3 Externalities for non adopters
In the main part of the paper, I make the simplifying assumption that the non adopters do
not benefit from externalities from the agents who adopt the technology. In this section, I show
that the main results hold when I relax this assumption, as long as peer effects remain positive.
I assume here that when agent i does not adopt the technology, he benefits from an externality
w0 ≥ 0 when one agent adopt the technology. Formally, his material payoff is:
pii(x) = ĉ+mw0, (19)
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if agent i does not adopt the technology (xi = 0) while m other agents adopt it.
Using this assumption I show the following result:
Proposition 6: If peer effects are positive (∆ = w−w0 > 0) the agents’ pro social motivation is
quasi-maximin (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), the optimal subsidy scheme that implements full technology adoption
as a unique Nash equilibrium of the adoption game is such that v∗1 = c− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w0 and:
v∗i = c− (i− 1)∆ (1 + θ(1− η))− θ(1− η)∆
i−1∑
t=1
(i− 1− t)(θη)t
− θη − (θη)
i + θ(1− η)(n− 1) (1− (θη)i)
1− θη w0, (20)
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
This result is an extension of Proposition 3. It characterizes the optimal subsidy scheme
when the non adopters receive positive externalities from adopters and peer effects are positive
(∆ = w − w0 > 0).
The effect of an increase of w0 on the individual subsidy level v
∗
i is ambiguous. On the one
hand, if the agents have no pro-social preferences, an increase in w0 leads to an increase in the
individual subsidies. Indeed, when the agents have no pro-social preferences (θ = 0), the subsidy
received by agent i is simply given by v∗i = c−(i−1)∆ = c−(i−1)(w−w0), which increases when
w0 increases. The intuition is that, in order to induce agent i to adopt the technology when the
agents that precede agent i adopt the technology while the subsequent agents do not, the principal
has to compensate agent i for the externalities he receives if he chooses not to participate, that is
(i− 1)w0. On the other hand, if the agents have sufficiently strong pro-social preferences (θ → 1)
and pure collective motivations (η = 0), an increase in w0 leads to a decrease in the subsidy
level received by the first agents. Indeed, in this case, the subsidy level of agent i is given by
c − 2(i − 1)w + (i− 1− (n− i))w0, which decreases when w0 increases if and only if i < n+12 .
The intuition is the following. An increase in w0 has two effects on the subsidy level of the
agents. The first effect is the same as in the case where the agents have no pro-social preferences.
The second effect comes from the fact that, when the agents that precede agent i adopt the
technology while the subsequent agents do not, if agent i adopts the technology, the principal can
decrease the subsidy level of agent i by agent i’s valuation of the externalities i generates for non
adopters, that is (n − i)w0. This explains why the subsidy of agent i is augmented by the term
(i− 1− (n− i))w0 here. The first effect prevails for the agents who are last in the ranking while
the second effect prevails for the agents who are first in the ranking.
I can now show that the comparative statics results still hold:
Corollary 4: If peer effects are positive (∆ = w − w0 > 0) and the agents have quasi-maximin
pro-social motivations (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), then pro-social preferences lead to an increase in objective
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inequality and to a decrease in subjective inequality:
∂(pi∗i − pi∗i+1)
∂θ
≥ 0 and ∂(U
∗
i − U∗i+1)
∂θ
< 0
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
This result is an extension of Corollary 3. It shows that even if non adopters receive positive
externalities from non adopters, pro-social preferences lead to an increase in objective inequality
and a decrease in subjective inequality as long as peer effects remain positive (w ≥ w0). I study
the case of negative peer effects (w < w0) in the next section.
4.4 Negative peer effects
Up to this point, I have assumed positive peer effects. I now consider the alternative situation
where peer effects are negative. Negative peer effects mean that an agent has less incentives to
adopt the technology when the number of other agents who adopt the technology increases. This
arises in the present setting if adopters generate lower externalities for the other adopters than
for the non adopters (∆ ≡ w − w0 < 0).16
I show that the optimal subsidy scheme is characterized as follows:
Proposition 7: If peer effects are negative (∆ = w−w0 < 0) and the agents’ pro social motivation
is quasi-maximin (0 ≤ η ≤ 1), then the optimal subsidy scheme that implements full technology
adoption as a unique Nash equilibrium of the adoption game is:
v∗i = c+ (n− 1)(w0 − w)− SPw, (21)
where SP = θ (n−1)(1−η)+η1−θη .
As in the case of positive peer effects, pro-social preferences lead to a decrease in individual
subsidies. However, differently from the case where peer effects are positive, subsidies are not
differentiated and all the agents obtain the same material payoff.
The intuition of this result is as follows. When peer effects are negative, an agent’s material
gain from technology adoption is lower when other agents adopt the technology. Moreover, when
an agent adopts the technology, he generates less externalities for the other agents when they
also adopt the technology. As a consequence, the least cost subsidy scheme has to make an agent
indifferent between adopting the technology and not adopting it when all the other agents adopt
the technology. The optimal unique implementation subsidy scheme is thus the same as in the
case of partial implementation (see Proposition 4), except that the outside option of the agent
here is not c but c+ (n− 1)w0 since the agent receives a total externality of (n− 1)w0 ≥ 0 when
he does not adopt the technology while the other agents adopt it.
5 Policy implications
The model analyzed in this paper covers situations in which there are technological external-
16In the terminology of Segal (2003), there are increasing externalities when ∆ ≥ 0 and decreasing when ∆ < 0.
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ities,17 or social learning externalities.18
Health technology adoption is a first field of application of the model (see Dupas, 2011 for
a review). Field experiments on the effect of anti-malaria technologies find strong positive peer
effects in the case of bed-nets interventions - whether the intervention was made in the form of
a price subsidy (Dupas, 2014) or free distribution (Hawley et al., 2003) - as well as in the case
of a therapeutic treatment intervention (Adhvaryu, 2014). Oster and Thornton (2012) also find
experimental evidence of a strong positive peer effect in the case of a sanitary product (menstrual
cups) and that the main mechanism is that peers teach others how to use the technology. In
contrast, in a field experiment on deworming pills adoption, Kremer and Miguel (2007) found
negative peer effects.
Agricultural technology adoption is another field of application of the model (see Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2010).19 Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Conley and Udry (2010) and Munshi (2004)
provide evidence that farmers learn how to optimally use inputs when cultivating a new crop
from the choices of peers within their village cultivating the same crop. Bandiera and Rasul
(2006) report evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between farmers’ adoption of a new
crop and the number of adopters within their network of family and friends, which suggests that
in this application peer effects are first positive and then negative. Carter et al. (2019) provide
field experimental evidence that farmers who belong to the network of peers of farmers who are
eligible for subsidized input prices are more likely to adopt the same inputs.
In light of these empirical results, my model provides several practical implications. The main
lessons that can be drawn from the model relate to (i) a potential upward bias in the estimates
of peer effects, and (ii) the design of optimal interventions.
(i) The results of the present paper show that pro-social preferences lead to lower individual
subsidies, because they facilitate technology adoption, whenever peer effects are positive or neg-
ative. This suggests that, when not taken into account, pro-social preferences tend to increase
the estimates of peer effects. Thus, empirical studies may overestimate positive peer effects and
underestimate negative peer effects. More importantly, if the bias is large, this may lead to con-
clude that peer effects are positive because the sample is composed of people who care about each
other while the peer effects would be negative in the absence of pro-social preferences.
(ii) The theoretical characterization of the optimal subsidy scheme enables to compute the sub-
sidy intervention that ensures adoption by all the members of a group of individuals at least cost.
In order to compute optimal individual subsidies, one can use estimates of the net opportunity
cost, of externalities, and of pro-social preferences (which can be measured using lab experimental
games, see Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). The optimal intervention could be implemented in the
form of vouchers of different values.
Moreover, the model implies that the form of the optimal subsidy scheme strongly depends
on whether peer effects are positive or negative. I have indeed shown that, when the individuals
17Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) state that positive (negative) technological externalities arise when the benefits
to an individual of adopting a technology are increasing when others also use this technology.
18Social learning arises if early adopters provide (voluntarily or not) late adopters with new information or
knowledge about the technology. Social learning can operate through providing more accurate information about
the private returns from adopting the technology or through directly affecting the returns. Situations in which
individuals initially underestimate the private returns of technology adoption or situation in which early adopters
learn to others how to use the technology are specific cases of increasing externalities.
19The literature has focused on inputs (new crop, fertilizer and improved seeds) for which peer effects can be
explained by social learning or social norms, but hardly by technological externalities.
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have pro-social motivations, the optimal subsidy scheme remains uniform in the case of negative
peer effects while it is differentiated in the case of positive peer effects. The results from the
aforementioned literature thus suggest that deworming pills should be subsidized uniformly (or
delivered for free to all the members of the target population), while anti-malaria technology
adoption and agricultural inputs adoption should be incentivized thanks to differentiated subsidies
(e.g. free delivery to a subset of the population).
In practice, differentiated subsidies are not always politically accepted. Indeed, the fact that
pro-social preferences should lead to more differentiated subsidies and then to more objective
inequality is not appealing for a public authority. However, I have shown that pro-social pref-
erences may lead to lower subjective inequality even if objective inequality increases. Hence, as
a result, acceptability of differentiated subsidies may not be an issue when the individuals care
about each other.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the role of pro-social preferences on the relationship between
incentives and inequality in a model in which a principal proposes individualized subsidies (bi-
lateral contracts) to a group of agents in order to induce technology adoption. I have shown
that agents’ pro-social preferences lead to a decrease in the implementation cost for the princi-
pal, a decrease in the payoff of each agent, an increase in objective inequality and a decrease in
subjective inequality.
The model can help to design an optimal intervention aiming at providing incentives for the
adoption of a new technology in developing countries. The results of the paper suggest that pro-
social preferences increase the estimates of peer effects and the likelihood of adoption. This calls
for caution as regards the use of the estimates from the aforementioned studies to other contexts
in which individuals do not strongly care about each other. The model also implies that the
optimal intervention should provide differentiated subsidized prices or differentiated access to the
technology when there are positive peer effects, and this is especially true when the individuals
belong to the same family or network of friends. The results also suggest that the acceptability
of differentiated subsidies may not be a crucial issue since pro-social motivations may lead to a
decrease in subjective inequality even though they lead to an increase in objective inequality.
There are several avenues for future research. Pro-social motivations are private information
in many contexts. I have shown that pro-socially motivated agents receive lower subsidies than
agents with standard (selfish) preferences when pro-social preferences are common knowledge.
Thus, the agents may have incentives not to reveal their pro-social motivation to the principal.
Extending the model to a situation with private information about pro-social preferences is an
important extension that is left for future research. I have also shown that pro-social motivations
lead to an increase in objective inequality. This could discourage technology adoption if the
agents are inequity averse besides having pro-social preferences. In the context of the present
model, pro-social preferences and inequity aversion may act in opposing directions. This second
possible extension is also left for future research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: See the Proof of Proposition 6 with w0 = 0 and η = 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: See the Proof of Proposition 6 with w0 = 0 and η = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3: See the Proof of Proposition 6 with w0 = 0.
Proof of Corollary 1: See the proof of Corollary 3 with η = 0.
Proof of Corollary 2: See the proof of Corollary 3 with η = 1.
Proof of Corollary 3: The difference between the subsidies received by two successive agents i
and i+ 1 is given by: The difference in the utility levels of two subsequent agents can be written
as follows:
U∗i − U∗i+1 = (1− θ)w + (1− θ)θ(1− η)w
1− (θη)i
1− θη . (22)
Differentiating this expression with respect to θ, I obtain:
(1− θη)2
w
∂(U∗i − U∗i+1)
∂θ
= (1− θ)(1− η)− (1− θη)2 − (θη)i(1− θ)(1− η) (1 + i(1− θη))
− (1− (θη)i) θ(1− η)(1− θη) < 0. (23)
Proof of Proposition 4: The situation in which all the agents adopt the technology is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if each agent i prefers to adopt the technology when all the other agents
adopt the technology:
(1− θi) (vi + (n− 1)w) + θiηiminj{vj + (n− 1)w}+ θi(1− ηi)
∑
j
vj + n(n− 1)w

≥ (1− θi)c+ θiηimin{minj 6=i{vj + (n− 2)w}, c}+ θi(1− ηi)
∑
j 6=i
vj + (n− 1)(n− 2)w + c
 ,
or,
[1− θi + θi(1− ηi)] (vi + (n− 1)w − c)
+ θiηi [minj{vj + (n− 1)w} −min{minj 6=i{vj + (n− 2)w}, c}] + θi(1− ηi)(n− 1)w ≥ 0. (24)
There are four cases to consider for each agent i: he gets more than the minimum payoff,
whether he adopts the technology or not, minj 6=ivj ≤ vi and minj 6=ivj + (n − 2)w < c; he
gets the minimum payoff when he adopts the technology while he does not when he deviates,
vi < minj 6=ivj ≤ c−(n−2)w; he does not get the minimum payoff when he adopts the technology
while he does when he deviates, c−(n−2)w ≤ minj 6=ivj ≤ vi; he gets the minimum payoff, whether
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he deviates or not, c− (n− 2)w < minj 6=ivj and vi < minj 6=ivj . The principal will not choose a
vector of subsidy such that one of the two latter cases arises, if there exist other feasible vectors
of subsidy. I will show such vectors do exist.
In order to minimize costs, the principal has thus two options. First, he may choose a vector
of subsidy v∗ such that minj 6=ivj ≤ vi and minj 6=ivj + (n− 2)w < c for all i. Assuming that the
principal (re)order the agents as described in the statement of the Proposition, he will choose
v∗i = c− (n− 1)w − (n−1)θi(1−ηi)+θiηi1−ηiθi w for all i 6= n and v∗n = v∗n−1.
Second, the principal may choose a vector of subsidy v˜ such that one agent (denoted s)
gets a strictly smaller payment than the other agents. The subsidy offered to agent s has to
be such that vs < minj 6=svj ≤ c − (n − 2)w and the subsidy offered to any other agent i has
to be such that minj 6=ivj ≤ vi and minj 6=ivj + (n − 2)w < c. The principal will thus set
v˜i = v
∗
i for all i 6= s. Letting k(s) be an agent such that minj 6=sv˜j = v˜k(s), according to the
description of case (ii) above, the subsidy v˜s must be such that c − (n − 1)w(1 + θs(1 − ηs)) −
θsηs
[
1 +
(n−1)θk(s)(1−ηk(s))+θk(s)ηk(s)
1−θk(s)ηk(s)
]
w ≤ v˜s < minj 6=sv∗j = v∗k(s). This inequality characterizes a
non empty set of subsidies v˜s only if
(n−1)θk(s)(1−ηk(s))+θk(s)ηk(s)
1−ηk(s)θk(s) <
(n−1)θs(1−ηs)+θsηs
1−ηsθs .
Hence, the vector of subsidy v˜ with s = n minimizes the cost of the principal as long as
Sn 6= Sn−1 while it is the vector of subsidy v∗ when Sn = Sn−1. The statement of Proposition 1
can be easily derived from this conclusion. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Assume that there are q − 1 agents (2 ≤ q ≤ n) who adopt the
technology and the other agents do not. Let P (i) denote the set of the q − 1 agents who adopt
the technology. Agent i ∈ N \ P (i) has an incentive to adopt the technology if and only if:
(1− θi) (vi + (q − 1)w) + θi
 ∑
j∈P (i)∪{i}
γij (vj + (q − 1)w) +
∑
j /∈P (i)∪{i}
γijcj

≥ (1− θi)ci + θi
 ∑
j∈P (i)
γij (vj + (q − 2)w) +
∑
j /∈P (i)
γijcj
 ,
(25)
or,
vi ≥ ci − (q − 1)w −
θi
∑
j∈P (i) γij
1− θi + θiγii w. (26)
Assume that full technology adoption is a Nash equilibrium. In order to eliminate all the
other outcomes as Nash equilibria and minimize his cost, the principal has to use a divide and
conquer scheme. The agents are thus ranked and condition (26) is binding and it can be written
as follows:
v∗i = ci − (i− 1)w − λi
∑
j<i
γijw, (27)
where λi =
θi
1−θi+θiγii . Now I characterize the optimal ranking. Assume that the agents are ranked
such that agent 1 is ranked first, agent 2 ranked second, etc. If the principal decides to permute
two subsequent agents k and k+1, then the sum of the subsidies increases by γkk+1 (λk+1 − λk)w.
Hence, the ranking that minimizes the implementation cost is such that agent i is ranked before
agent i+1 only if λi ≤ λi+1. To check that full technology adoption is a Nash equilibrium, notice
that condition (26) holds when vi is replaced by v
∗
i , q by n and P (i) by N \ i.
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Proof of Proposition 6: Here the utility function of agent i is given by:
Ui(x) = (1− θ)pii(x) + θ
η min{pi1(x), ..., pin(x)}+ (1− η)∑
j∈N
pij(x)
 . (28)
Assume that the incentive scheme has the divide and conquer property: the agents are ordered
such that ij+1 is the agent that has an incentive to adopt the technology when the first j agents
adopt the technology and the remaining agents do not. The corresponding formal condition for
agent i1 is:
(1− θ)vi1 + θηmin{vi1 , c+ w0}+ θ(1− η) (vi1 + (n− 1)c+ (n− 1)w0)
≥ (1− θ)c+ θηc+ θ(1− η)nc, (29)
or,
(1− θ)(vi1 − c) + θηmin{vi1 − c, w0}+ θ(1− η) (vi1 − c+ (n− 1)w0) ≥ 0. (30)
For agent ij+1 with 2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n − 1 the corresponding formal condition can be written as
follows:
(1− θ)(vij+1 + jw) + θηmin{vip(j+1) + jw, c+ (j + 1)w0}
+ θ(1− η)
∑
k≤j+1
(vk + jw) + θ(1− η)
∑
j+2≤k≤n
(c+ (j + 1)w0)
≥ (1− θ)(c+ jw0) + θηmin{vip(j) + (j − 1)w, c+ jw0}
+ θ(1− η)
∑
k≤j
(vk + (j − 1)w) + θ(1− η)
∑
j+1≤k≤n
(c+ jw0) (31)
where ip(j+1) is the agent such that minl≤j+1{vl} = vip(j+1) .
Condition (31) is equivalent to:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) + θ (1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆) ≥
θη
(
min{vip(j) + (j − 1)w, c+ jw0} −min{vip(j+1) + jw, c+ (j + 1)w0}
)
, (32)
and for agent in, the condition is:
(1− θη)(vin + (n− 1)∆− c) + θ (1− η) (n− 1)w ≥
θη
(
min{vip(n−1) + (n− 2)w, c+ (n− 1)w0} −
(
vip(n) + (n− 1)w
))
,
(33)
Step 1: I show that any contract that is characterized by the divide and conquer property and that
minimizes the implementation cost is such that each agent is indifferent between adopting and not
adopting the technology when all the preceding agents in the ranking adopt the technology while
all the subsequent agents in the ranking do not.
In other words, I show in this Step 1 that the least cost contract such condition (30), condition
(32) for j + 1 = 2, ..., n− 1 and condition (33) hold is such that all these inequalities are binding.
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Let first show that the claim holds for 1 ≤ k + 1 ≤ n − 1. Notice that condition (30) is
more likely to be binding when vi1 decreases and that condition (32) for j + 1 = k + 1 is more
likely to be binding when vik+1 decreases. A sufficient condition for the principal to choose to
bind condition (30) or (32) for j + 1 = k + 1 is thus that a decrease in vik+1 does not make
any other constraint less likely to hold. Let me first focus on condition (32) for l + 1 ≤ n − 1.
Let me show that Ωl+1 ≡ min{vip(l) + (l − 1)w, c + lw0} −min{vip(l+1) + lw, c + (l + 1)w0} for
l+1 ≤ n−1 and l+1 6= k+1 does not increase when vik+1 decreases. First assume that l+1 ≤ k.
In this case, Ωl+1 does not depend on vik+1 . Second, assume that k + 2 ≤ l + 1 ≤ n − 1. If
ip(l) 6= ik+1 then ip(l+1) 6= ik+1 and then Ωl+1 does not depend on vik+1 . If ip(l+1) = ik+1 then
ip(l) = ik+1 and Ωl+1 = min{vik+1 +(l−1)w, c+ lw0}−min{vik+1 + lw, c+(l+1)w0}. Notice that
if min{vik+1 + lw, c+(l+1)w0} = vik+1 + lw then min{vik+1 +(l−1)w, c+ lw0} = vik+1 +(l−1)w.
Thus Ωl+1 cannot increase when vik+1 decreases. If ip(l) = ik+1 and ip(l+1) 6= ik+1, then Ωl+1 does
not increase when vik+1 decreases. Let me now consider condition (33). If ip(n−1) 6= ik+1 then
ip(n) 6= ik+1 and then condition (33) does not depend on vik+1 . If ip(n−1) = ik+1 and ip(n) 6= ik+1,
then condition (33) is more likely to hold when vik+1 decreases. If ip(n) = ik+1 then ip(n−1) = ik+1
and condition (33) becomes:
(1− θη)(vin + (n− 1)∆− c) ≥
− θη (vik+1 + (n− 1)w −min{vik+1 + (n− 2)w, c+ (n− 1)w0})− θ (1− η) (n− 1)w, (34)
If vik+1+(n−2)w ≤ c+(n−1)w0, then condition (34) does not depend on vik+1 . If vik+1+(n−2)w >
c+ (n− 1)w0, condition (34) becomes:
(1− θη)(vin + (n− 1)∆− c) ≥ −θη
(
vik+1 + (n− 1)∆− c
)− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w. (35)
Condition (35) can be rewritten as follows:
(1− θη)(vin − vik+1) ≥ −
(
vik+1 + (n− 1)∆− c
)− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w. (36)
The right hand side in (36) is negative because vik+1 + (n − 2)w > c + (n − 1)w0 and the left
hand side is positive because ip(n) = ik+1. I conclude that, in this case, condition (33) always
holds. Hence, the principal chooses vik+1 such that condition (32) for j + 1 = k + 1 is binding if
k + 1 < n and such that condition (33) is binding if k + 1 = n.
To conclude Step 1, it remains to show that the claim also holds for agent in. It is sufficient
to observe that condition (33) is more likely to hold when vin increases and that all the other
constraints do not depend on vin .
It is easy to show that when condition (30) is binding, the least cost contract is such that
vi1 = c− θ ((1− η)(n− 1) + η)w0.
Step 2: Let me show that the least cost contract characterized by the divide and conquer property
is such that the payoff of an agent who adopts the technology -when all the preceding agents also
do so and the remaining agents do not- is lower than the payoff of the agents who do not adopt
the technology, that is to say vij + (j − 1)w ≤ c+ jw0 for all j ≤ n− 1.
We know from Step 1 that the least cost contract which has the divide and conquer property
22
is such that vi1 = c− θ ((1− η)(n− 1) + η)w0, thus the claim holds in this case.
For all 2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n− 1, we have:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) + θ(1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆)
= θη
(
min{vip(j) + (j − 1)w, c+ jw0} −min{vip(j+1) + jw, c+ (j + 1)w0}
)
. (37)
Notice that the definition of p() implies that vip(j+1) ≤ vip(j) . There are two sub-cases to
consider.
First, if vip(j+1) + w ≥ vip(j) , the right hand side in condition (37) is negative, and then a
simple inspection of condition (37) leads to conclude that vij+1 + jw ≤ c+ (j + 1)w0.
Second, if vip(j+1) +w < vip(j) , then we must have vip(j+1) = vij+1 . There are two sub-sub-cases
to consider. First, if vip(j) + (j − 1)w ≥ c+ jw0, condition (37) can be rewritten as follows:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + jw − c− (j + 1)w0) + θηmin{vij+1 + jw − c− (j + 1)w0, 0}
= −θ(1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆)− w0, (38)
and then vij+1 + jw − c ≤ c + (j + 1)w0. Second, if vip(j) + (j − 1)w < c + jw0, condition (37)
becomes:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) + θ(1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆)
= θη
(
vip(j) + (j − 1)w −min{vij+1 + jw, c+ (j + 1)w0}
)
. (39)
Assume that vij+1 + jw > c+ (j + 1)w0. Hence, condition (39) becomes
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) + θ(1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆)
= θη
(
vip(j) + (j − 1)w − c− (j + 1)w0
)
. (40)
In this case, the right hand side of condition (40) is negative and then vij+1 + jw ≤ c+ (j+ 1)w0,
which is a contradiction. We thus must have vij+1 + jw ≤ c+ (j + 1)w0.
An implication of Step 1 and Step 2 is that the least cost contract that respects the divide
and conquer property is such that vi1 = c− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w0 and,
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) + θη
(
vip(j+1) + j∆− c
)
= θη
(
vip(j) + (j − 1)∆− c
)
− θ(1− η) ((n− 1)w0 + j∆)− θηw0, (41)
for all 2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n.
Step 3: Let me show that the least cost contract characterized by the divide and conquer property is
such that the higher the rank of an agent in the given order, the lower his subsidy level: vij+1 < vij
for all j.
Since the choice of the subsidy offered to an agent does not depend on the choice of the
subsidies offered to the subsequent agents (see condition (41)), the principal has an incentive to
choose vij+1 ≤ vij for all j. I assume this is true and I will check that the solution respects this
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condition. We thus have vip(j+1) = vij+1 for all j. In this case, the least cost contract that respects
the necessary condition is characterized by vi1 = c−θ(1−η)(n−1)w0 and the following recursive
formula:
vij+1 + j∆ − c = θη(vij + (j − 1)∆ − c) − θ(1 − η)j∆ − (θ(1− η)(n− 1) + θη)w0, (42)
for all j = 1, ..., n− 1. Solving for the recursive formula, I find that:
vij+1 = c− j∆ (1 + θ(1− η))− θ(1− η)∆
j∑
t=1
(j − t)(θη)t
− θ (η + (1− η)(n− 1))− (1 + θ(1− η)(n− 1)) (θη)
j+1
1− θη w0, (43)
for all 2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n. The difference between two subsequent terms is then:
vij − vij+1 = ∆ + θ(1− η)∆
1− (θη)j
1− θη + (1 + θ(1− η)(n− 1)) (θη)
jw0 > 0. (44)
Step 4: I show that the least cost contract characterized by the divide and conquer property is
such that any situation in which m < n agents adopt the technology is not a Nash equilibrium of
the technology adoption game.
It is sufficient to show that the least cost contract characterized by the divide and conquer
property is such that agent ij+1 with j + 1 ≤ n− 1 prefers to adopt the technology than not to
adopt it when any other j agents adopt the technology. First notice that the claim holds for agent,
since i1 has an incentive to adopt the technology when no other agent adopts the technology. Let
me now show that the claim also holds for any agent 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. We know from the definition
of the divide and conquer property that agent j+ 1 adopts the technology when the j first agents
also do so. Now assume that j agents adopt the technology and that at least one of these agents
k is such that k > j + 1. Using the results from Steps 2 and 3, we know that the last agent in
the ranking who adopts the technology is the one who obtains the lowest payoff among all the
agents, whenever agent j + 1 adopts the technology or not. Hence, using condition (32), we have
that agent ij+1 with 2 ≤ j + 1 ≤ n − 1 adopts the technology when j other agents also do so if
and only if:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) ≥ −θηw − θ(1− η)j∆− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w0. (45)
Condition (42) can be written as follows:
(1− θη)(vij+1 + j∆− c) = θη
(
vij − vij+1 −∆
)− θ(1− η)j∆− θ(1− η)(n− 1)w0. (46)
Substituting condition (46) into condition (45), we have that condition (45) is equivalent to
vij − vij+1 ≥ −w0, which is true according the result from Step 3.
Step 5: It remains to show that the least cost contract characterized by the divide and conquer
property is such that the situation in which all the agents adopt the technology is a Nash equilib-
rium.
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This is indeed a Nash equilibrium if and only if each agent i prefers to adopt the technology
than not when all the other agents adopt it. We know from previous Steps that this claim holds
for agent in. It remains to show that the claim holds for the other agents. An agent ij such that
j < n prefers to adopt the technology when all other agents do if and only if:
(1− θ) (vij + (n− 1)w)+ θη (vin + (n− 1)w) + θ(1− η)
(∑
k
vik + n(n− 1)w
)
≥ (1−θ) (c+ (n− 1)w0)+θη (vin + (n− 2)w)+θ(1−η)
∑
k 6=ij
vik + (n− 1)(n− 2)w + c+ (n− 1)w0
 ,
or,
(1− θη) (vij + (n− 1)∆− c) ≥ −θηw − θ(1− η)(n− 1)w. (47)
We know from Step 4 that condition (45) holds. Using condition (45), we can easily show
that (47) also holds if ∆ ≥ 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4: Compared to the situation considered in Corollary 3, the difference be-
tween the subsidy levels of two subsequent agents v∗i−v∗i+1 is augmented by (1 + θ(1− η)(n− 1)) (θη)iw0.
This additional term increases when θ increases.
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